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Abstract: This paper appraises how countries with inflation 
targeting fared during the current crisis, with the goal of 
establishing the stylized facts that will guide and motivate 
future research. We find that relative to other countries, IT 
countries lowered nominal policy rates by more and this 
loosening translated into an even larger differential in real 
interest rates; were less likely to face deflation scares; and saw 
sharp real depreciations not associated with a greater 
perception of risk by markets. We also find some weak 
evidence that IT countries did better on unemployment rates 
and advanced IT countries have had relatively stronger 
industrial production performance. Finally, we find that 
advanced IT countries had higher GDP growth rates than their 
non-IT peers, but no such difference for emerging countries or 
the full sample. 
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“Inflation targeting is being put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail” – Joseph 
Stiglitz, 2008. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In September 15th 2008, the failure of Lehmann Brothers triggered a once in a lifetime storm 
in global financial markets that tipped the global economy into a tailspin. Credit spreads 
widened, asset prices collapsed, and the wheels were set in motion for significant economic 
contractions in nearly every country in the world in the subsequent months. This event may 
define the research agenda of economists for years to come and how different policy 
frameworks fare in dealing with such a shock will have an important impact on how we are 
going to carry out prudential regulation, monetary and fiscal policy for several decades. 
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One of the major questions facing macroeconomists in the post-crisis is whether the 
monetary policy regimes of the Great Moderation years should survive or be scrapped. 
 
In this paper, we thus focus on the inflation targeting monetary framework (IT). Our goal is 
to fill IT’s scorecard when dealing with a global sudden stop. Since that is a first take on this 
question, and the events are still unfolding, our primary goal is to uncover the stylized facts 
instead of testing the implications of macroeconomic models or establishing the relative 
importance of different mechanisms at work; and we stand ready to update this paper as new 
evidence accumulates. 
 
The advantages or pitfalls of inflation targeting are the subject of many empirical papers, but 
the focus of the literature has been mostly on inflation and output outcomes over several 
years (e.g. Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Batini and Laxton, 2007; Gonçalves and Salles, 2008; 
Brito and Bystedt, 2009), but not on the response to specific global shocks and the policy 
challenges they ensue. 
 
One influential interpretation of inflation targeting due to Anna Schwartz (as described in 
Romer, 2006, pp. 532) is that IT is not more than a “conservative window dressing” as the 
key factor is a commitment by the central bankers to achieve low inflation outcomes.  Under 
this view, there would be no difference between outcomes for IT and non-IT countries that 
are committed to low inflation. Conversely, IT differs  from other monetary frameworks 
aiming price stability. Some economists argue that IT’s emphasis on credibility and 
communication matters for inflation expectations. Also important, IT is typically 
accompanied by (somewhat) flexible exchange rates and this feature may give it an extra 
resiliency to some external shocks that some other monetary frameworks may lack.1  
 
On one side, it should be mentioned that IT has been subject to many pointed criticisms. Its 
narrow focus on inflation may blind central bankers from other worthwhile objectives such 
as reducing unemployment (E.g. Stiglitz, 2008); IT central banks may also lose sight to 
important determinants of financial stability as they adopted intellectual frameworks suited to 
chieving this narrow goal (Buiter, 2009). Those criticisms may be particularly relevant 
during the period we study. More generally, IT may suffer from some problems typical for 
countries with flexible exchange rates, more so for emerging markets, as flexible exchange 
rates may also be destabilizing in the presence of liability dollarization (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002).  
 
                                                 
1 Hungary tried to have an exchange rate target whilst it operated an inflation targeting framework, but it 
abandoned their narrower exchange rate target after 2004 and its wider +/- 15 percent target was abandoned in 
February 2008 (Stone and others, 2009, pp. 43-45) 
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On the other side, there are indeed some reasons why IT might provide the proper tools for 
dealing with the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
First, for many economists, the risk of deflation is a crucial consideration for policymaking in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Decressin and Laxton, 2009). When facing 
deflationary risks, the credibility of an inflation targeting regime may then play an important 
role at avoiding a liquidity trap and the perils of a zero interest rate corner. This has been 
underscored by the communication strategy of IT central banks. For instance, in the words of 
Governor Carney of the Bank of Canada: “Just as inflation targeting has proven its ability to 
prevent the entrenchment of high and volatile inflation, it also has the power to prevent the 
onset of persistent deflation.”2 
 
Second, the credibility of IT frameworks also allows for emerging market IT adopters, which 
typically have a greater volatility and upside risks of inflation as an advanced country, to 
have a considerably greater scope for monetary policy easing without compromising their 
inflation outlooks (Ghosh and others, 2009). 
  
Third, it is also the case that during periods of global booms and excess liquidity, IT central 
banks may be more prone to have tight monetary policy leaning against the wind, in pursuit 
of their inflation target. As IT countries were found to have higher interest rates during the 
expansion phase prior to the crisis, their procyclical interest rates may hinder the onset of 
lending booms or make the high yield from foreign assets of dubious quality less attractive 
thereby protecting their financial system. Moreover, when a crisis hits, countries that start 
from a position of higher nominal interest rates have more room for rate cuts and therefore 
less need for costly extraordinary fiscal measures. 
 
Fourth, as we mentioned above, there is a significant correlation between inflation targeting 
and flexible exchange rate regimes. Flexible exchange rates have long been recognized in the 
literature as shock-absorbers (e.g. Broda, 2004; Edwards and Levy Yeyati, 2005; Mendoza 
1995) and may explain the relative performance of IT countries. 
 
In the next section we present the methodology; in section III, the main results; in section IV, 
we examine other considerations; in section V we conclude. 
 
 
II.   METHODOLOGY 
The regression we want to estimate is: 
                                                 
2 Remarks by Governor Carney Remarks by Mark Carney to the Halifax Chamber of Commerce, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, in 27 January 2009 (downloaded from http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2009/sp09-2.html) 
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 it i t t i ity IT         (0.1) 
  
where yit is the dependent variable of interest, i is a country specific effectt  is a time-
effect, and it is a idiosyncratic shock. The parameter of interest is t , which measures the 
difference in variable yit between inflation-targeting and other countries. 
 
We also define the time-effect for inflation targeting and other countries: 
 
 ITt t t     (0.2) 
 Ot t   (0.3) 
 
Equation 0.1 can be estimated with OLS, thereby capturing a notion of a mean IT effect or 
using median (quantile) regression, measuring the effect of IT on the median IT country 
relative to the median country adopting other monetary policy framework. Then we can 
examine the coefficients of time dummies (with standard error bands) and the coefficients of 
the IT – time dummies interactions against time. 
 
Our full sample excludes countries for which nominal GDP in dollars (variable ngdpd in the 
WEO) in 2002 was less than USD 10 billion; Zimbabwe because it is an outlier on several 
dimensions; Angola, Qatar, Sudan and United Arab Emirates because their inflation rates at 
the INS dataset are constant over several months, and the United States as the source of the 
initial shock. This leaves us with a full sample of 84 countries. Notice that Iceland, perhaps 
the inflation targeter facing the most troublesome crisis, and also the only one that has 
suspended IT during the crisis, is cut off the sample because it does not meet the criteria on 
nominal GDP. But that is true also for Latvia, an emerging market with a fixed exchange rate 
system and one of the countries with largest drop in output in 2008/09. 
 
We start by analyzing monetary policy responses, first through nominal interest rates, then 
through the resulting real interest rates; their impact on inflation and real exchange rates. We 
also look at EMBI spreads and CDS premia in order to assess how markets evaluated IT 
countries relative to their counterparts. Then finally we look at economic activity outcomes, 
in particular, unemployment rates, industrial production and GDP growth rates. 
 
 
III.   RESULTS 
Since the event is very recent, we focus on variables that are high frequency (monthly when 
feasible, quarterly otherwise), and available for the vast majority of advanced and emerging 
market economies (there is no point in including small poor developing countries since they 
typically do not have the institutional capability for inflation targeting). 
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We present results for the full sample; but also for subsamples of emerging market and 
advanced countries. We define emerging markets as countries for which we can obtain the 
J.P. Morgan EMBI spread (see the Data Appendix for the details). For each regression we 
use a balanced panel from January 2006 to August 2009. Since data availability differs across 
countries, so does country coverage in the regressions. The details on data availability and 
sample coverage are in the Data Appendix. 
 
To compare the performance of different monetary regimes as they react to a major financial 
disruption, it is only natural that we start out by looking at how interest rates behaved in IT 
and non-IT countries before and after the crisis. The experience in the Great Depression and 
in Japan during the nineties highlights the ineffectiveness of monetary policy when nominal 
interest rates approach the zero bound and the standard tools of monetary policy are unable to 
lower the real interest rate. It is then crucial that a monetary regime allows for sharp 
reductions in nominal interest rates that result in sharp reductions in real interest rates when 
that is called for by a global sudden stop. 
 
We focus first on policy rates. We have a sample with 49 countries, of which 21 are inflation 
targeters, with data through November 2009. Countries in the Euro area are classified as non-
IT countries and we use the common Euro area policy rate for their policy rate (details of the 
sample composition are in the Data Appendix). Concentrating first on nominal rates, from 
the beginning of 2008 to August 2008, on average there were nominal rate increases for both 
groups of countries, but slightly more so for IT countries. The tightening momentum in IT 
countries can be grasped by noticing that in September 2008, i.e. after the Lehman failure, 6 
out of 22 IT countries tightened their policy rates (Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Peru and 
Sweden). However, as the crisis deepened, IT countries cut their policy rates by 2 percentage 
points more (Chart 1, a) and the difference in mean policy rates across the two groups has 
been statistically significant and persistent (Chart 1, b). 
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Chart 1. (a) Median policy rate for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Difference in the time effects of 
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policy rates for IT and non-IT countries, (August 2008 is the base period).  
 
Then we move to the effect on real policy rates. Ideally we would have an ex-ante measure of 
real interest rates based on some forward-looking expectations of inflation. Those are indeed 
available for a few countries through the yield curve on nominal and real bonds or from 
expectation surveys. But in the interest of having a wider sample, we calculate real interest 
rates using the backward looking 12 month inflation rate. The evidence supports that IT 
countries have managed to avoid an increase in their real policy rates since the crisis (chart 
2,a), which corresponds to a loosening of their real policy rates relative to non-IT countries 
since the crisis struck by about 4 percentage points (chart 2,b). 
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Chart 2. (a) Median real policy rates for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Difference in the time effects of 
real policy rates for IT and non-IT countries (August 2008 is the base period).  
 
 
 
We now want to understand how IT countries managed to translate their relative loosening of 
nominal policy rates into a loosening in real interest rates. On the inflation front (n=84, of 
which 25 IT countries; data through November 2009), IT seems to have better anchored 
inflation expectations, even in the immediate aftermath of global financial turmoil. Price 
levels dropped across the board in the last two months of 2008: the average annualized 
inflation rate was lower by 5 percent for IT countries, 6½ percent for the others in December 
2009 relative to August 2009; and both the median IT and non-IT country had negative 
monthly inflation in December 2009 (Chart 3, a). While the path of inflation for the median 
IT and non-IT countries did not differ significantly since the crisis started, IT countries seem 
to have had a better track record at avoiding persistent deflationary processes in the 
subsequent months. IT countries were less likely to go through a deflation scare, defined as 
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the event of three consecutive negative readings of the monthly inflation rate, with a 
statistically significant difference for 2008M12-2009M1 and 2009M6 (Chart 3,b).3 
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Chart 3. (a) Median monthly annualized inflation for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Probability of 3 
subsequent months of negative inflation rates for IT and non-IT countries.  
 
Having established thus far that IT countries seem to have on average better dodged the 
deflation bullet and been able to lower nominal and real interest rates by more than non-IT 
countries, we examine whether their real exchange rate has helped inject external demand 
when that was most needed.  
 
The real effective exchange rate (REER, n=84, of which 25 IT countries; data through 
August 2009) of IT countries depreciated sharply in relation to other countries with the onset 
of the global crisis. With August 2008 as a base period, the real effective exchange rate 
depreciation for the average IT country was more than 15 percentage points by the first 
quarter of 2009 and while their exchange rates bounced back since 2009Q2, they are on 
average about 5 percent weaker in August 2009 than they were at the outset of the crisis 
(Chart 4). This finding of sharp real depreciation for IT countries after the crisis unfolded, 
followed by some appreciation towards pre-crisis levels is valid for the full sample of 89 
countries but it is also robust to including only the subset of 31 emerging markets, and to 
excluding countries with pegs or heavily managed floats against the U.S. dollar before the 
crisis.4  
                                                 
3 In August 2009, there were 2 IT countries with 3 consecutive readings of monthly negative inflation (Chile 
and Republic of Serbia) and 7 non-IT countries (Bulgaria, China, P.R.: Mainland, Ireland, Japan, Libya, 
Lithuania and Taiwan Province of China). 
4 We define pegs or heavily managed floats against the U.S. dollar as currencies whose exchange rate against 
the U.S. dollar had a monthly standard deviation of less than 1% in the period from 2006M1 through 2008M8. 
There are 18 such countries in our full sample: Argentina, Belarus, China, P.R.: Mainland, China, P.R.: Hong 
(continued) 
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As striking as this finding may seem, it is no artifact of sample choice or driven by outliers. 
In an universe of 85 countries, of which 25 were IT countries, the 12 countries with the 
largest real depreciations six months into the crisis (February 2009) were all IT countries 
(starting from the largest real depreciations, those are: Poland, with -31½ percent, Mexico, 
Republic of Korea, Australia, Brazil, Hungary, Colombia, New Zealand, Indonesia, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Turkey, with -17½ percent). The flip side of the concentration of IT 
countries among the ones with large real depreciations is the absence of IT countries among 
the top 30 countries with real appreciations during that period (e.g. Japan appreciated by 26½ 
percent, and Venezuela, Rep. Bol. by 24 percent). 
 
Since IT countries had larger real depreciations than other countries with flexible exchange 
rate systems, it would be interesting to sort out whether IT countries are better inoculated 
against fear of floating than non-IT floaters (say, because IT emerging market countries may 
be less prone to liability dollarization).  
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Chart 4. Changes in log real effective exchange rates (REER) for IT and non-IT countries, since 
January 2006, (a) average for all countries in the sample; (b) average for 31 emerging market 
countries.  
 
But a real effective depreciation may be of little help if accompanied by a disruption of 
confidence, higher risk premia and a larger assessment of sovereign default risk by the 
markets. So we next turn to the behavior of two measures of risk premia, the EMBI spread 
and the premia on sovereigns’ credit default swaps. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kong, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, Rep. Bol., Vietnam, Republic of Yemen 
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For the balanced panel of emerging market countries for which I have EMBI spread data for 
the period of analysis (n=29, of which 12 IT countries, with data through December 2009), 
we can show that the real exchange rate depreciation for IT countries was not driven by a 
relative increase in risk perception of those countries (Chart 5). On the left panel, we display 
median EMBI spreads for both groups of countries – if we used means, the spike in late 2008 
for non-IT countries would be exacerbated. EMBI spreads for IT and non-IT emerging 
countries rose sharply at the outset of the crisis, but increases for non-IT countries were 
sharper.5 Hence there was a sharp reduction in the average EMBI spread for emerging market 
IT countries relative to other emerging markets: while in November 2008 the average spread 
of IT countries was about 400 basis points wider than it was two months before, for non-IT 
emerging markets this figure was 700 basis points; moreover, spreads for IT E.M.s started to 
narrow in November 2008, but continued to widen for other E.M.s until December 2008 
when they were more than 800 basis points above their pre-crisis levels. Interestingly, EMBI 
spreads for both IT and non-IT emerging countries all but returned to August 2008 levels by 
October 2009. 
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Chart 5. (a) Median EMBI spread for IT and non-IT countries, since January 2006; (b) difference 
between time effects of IT and non-IT countries (August 2008 is the base period).  
 
CDS spreads (n= 33, of which 15 IT countries) are also a gauge for financial markets 
sentiment about countries and tell a similar story as EMBI spreads do: in October 2008, CDS 
spreads increased across the board, but starting in December 2008, the average spread for IT 
countries is between 50 and 100 basis points lower than for other countries. While this 
difference is economically significant and matches the evidence from EMBI spreads (which 
regards only emerging markets), that is not statistically significant at the usual levels and the 
                                                 
5 The spreads for Argentina, Ecuador, Pakistan, Ukraine and Venezuela, Rep. Bol., all of them non-IT countries, 
increased by more than 1,000 basis points at their peak relative to August 2008.  
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point estimates of differences and means are driven by outliers (e.g. Ukraine’s large increase 
in CDS spreads). 
 
In summary, the evidence from risk spreads is that while they have mostly returned to their 
pre-crisis levels as we speak, it is fair to say that IT emerging countries on average managed 
to smooth this shock much better than other emerging markets.6  
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Chart 6. (a) Median CDS spreads for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Difference in the time effects of 
CDS premia for IT and non-IT countries (August 2008 is the base period).  
 
But the ultimate variables of interest are the measures of economic activity: unemployment 
rates, industrial production and GDP.  
 
The effect of the crisis on unemployment rates (n=50, of which 22 IT countries; data 
through August 2009) was initially very similar across countries with different monetary 
policy frameworks. Both the median IT and non-IT countries entered 2008 with a declining 
path for unemployment rates. With the onset of the crisis, unemployment rates spiked up 
everywhere but they did by more for the median IT country up to the first 2 months of 2009. 
From then on, unemployment rates seem to have stabilized for IT countries, and not so for 
non-IT ones, but thus far the difference is not statistically significant. However using 12 
month changes in the unemployment rate, we find that the unemployment rate of non-IT 
countries started increasing at a faster pace since the first 2 months of 2009, and by June 
2009, a statistically significant difference had emerged favoring IT countries: their 
unemployment rate was then increasing annually by about ½ percentage point less than other 
countries. 7 With the caveat of the very small sample sizes, this effect is driven by the 
                                                 
6 That is not only driven by a few outliers, since this result is true for median regressions too. 
7 Qualitatively and quantitatively similar results are obtained when using seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rates in levels, albeit less statistical significance. In particular, when using unemployment rates in levels, the 
(continued) 
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advanced economies sample – for emerging markets (n=14, of which 9 IT countries) no IT 
effect was found. 
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Chart 7. (a) Median unemployment for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Difference in time effects of 
changes in unemployment rates for IT and non-IT countries (August 2008 is the base period). 
 
The results on industrial production (n=53, of which 20 IT countries, with data through 
September 2009) are very striking: IT countries seem to be ahead in their road to recovery of 
industrial production to pre-crisis levels. While in December 2008, both IT and non-IT 
countries had industrial production on average 9 percent lower than at the outset of the crisis; 
by the most recent observation (September 2009), there is an economically and statistically 
significant difference: the loss in industrial output is running about 12½ percent of August 
2008 levels for non-IT countries, while the same figure for IT countries is about 8½ percent. 
When we examine the results for advanced and emerging countries, we find that much of the 
performance advantage seems to be driven by the advanced countries subsample (n=26, of 
which 7 IT countries8), more specifically by the very poor performance of non-IT advanced 
countries relative to all other subset of countries. Conversely, there is no statistical difference 
in post-crisis behavior of IT and non-IT emerging countries with regards to industrial 
production performance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
difference between IT and non-IT countries has a slightly smaller magnitude (0.35 percentage points in August 
2009), but the confidence intervals are wider therefore the difference is not statistically significant (results 
available upon request). 
8 Those are Canada, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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Chart 8. (a) Median change in industrial production since January 2006, for IT and non-IT countries; 
(b) Difference in time effects of industrial production for IT and non-IT countries, (August 2008 is 
the base period). 
 
Last but not the least, the results on the evolution of real GDP (n=49, of which 21 IT 
countries, data from 2001 through 2009Q2) tell an interesting story.9 To skip dealing with 
seasonal effects, we use growth rates relative to the same quarter in the previous year. There 
are interesting patterns in the data, even as we cannot claim statistical significance to the 
differences we report. It appears that IT countries do relatively better when the world 
economy is doing worse. The differential in growth rates for the median IT over non-IT 
country was positive in the aftermath of the financial turmoil and growth slowdown occurred 
in the post 9-11 and after the onset of the current crisis. On the other hand, there was a small 
difference in mean growth rates favoring non-IT countries in the booming period leading up 
to the crisis (chart 9,b). While we believe that we cannot argue that those differences are 
causal, as they may be caused by differences in the characteristics of the IT/non-IT countries 
or by the adoption of policies other than IT (omitted variables problem), the evidence shows 
that IT countries seem to be more resilient than other countries during global slumps or 
slowdowns. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Results qualitatively similar if seasonally adjusted quarterly growth rates are used instead. 
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Chart 9. (a) Median GDP growth rate since 2001Q1, for IT and non-IT countries; (b) Difference in 
time effects of GDP growth rate for IT and non-IT countries, (2008 Q3 is the base period). 
 
 
IV.   ROBUSTNESS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS  
We should now mention two other important factors that might be at play. 
 
A.   Dealing with time aggregation 
The estimates presented in the previous section are suggestive that economic activity may 
have contracted by less for IT countries. However, in general the differences are not 
statistical significant, perhaps because there is too much idiosyncratic variation in the 
quarterly and monthly series we analyzed. One way to improve the signal-to-noise ratio is to 
use a coarser time aggregation, such as by semester. 
 
The regression results using semiannual data for the economic activity measures are reported 
in Table 1, for a sample of 51 countries from 2003H1 to 2009H1. We estimate a double fixed 
effects model (country and time effects), with robust standard errors. For the sake of 
comparability, we keep the sample of countries constant across all regressions. The results 
show that there is a marginally significant difference in GDP growth rates in 2009 favoring 
IT countries (column 1), but the effect is concentrated among the advanced IT countries. As 
regards industrial production, the effect in favor of IT countries is economically significant 
(of the order of 7 percentage points) and marginally significant for the full sample and the 
non-advanced countries sub-sample. Finally, the model does not identify any statistically 
significant difference for the unemployment rates. 
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B.   Omitted variables 
If countries choose their monetary and exchange rate regimes instead of by a mere accident 
of history, the choice of monetary policy regime may reflect risk characteristics of an 
economy. For concreteness, it is possible that IT countries face a common risk factor that 
drives their performance. In that case, IT is not allocated randomly and differences in the 
performance of IT and non-IT countries may reflect other subjacent factors. It is therefore 
interesting to examine if our finding that IT countries did not fare worse and may have fared 
slightly better with regards to economic activity stands after we add controls for other factors 
identified in the literature as relevant explanatory variables for the economic contraction in 
the current crisis. 
 
The existing literature on the determinants of contractions in the current crisis (e.g. 
Blanchard and Faruqee, 2010) has indicated some variables correlated to GDP contractions 
in the current crisis, such as the ratio of 
short-term external debt to GDP, the degree 
of openness to trade, the change in the 
commodity terms of trade, and the average 
GDP growth of trading partners.10  
 
For each one of those factors, we run a 
regression of the growth rate in the first 
semester of 2009 (relative to the first 
semester of the previous year), as we report 
in Table 2 below. In column 1, we report a 
positive but statistically insignificant relation 
between IT and growth in the first semester 
of 2009, for a sample of 56 advanced and 
non-advanced countries. In column 2, we 
split the sample and find that any positive effect, even if statistically insignificant, is driven 
by the subset of advanced countries.  
 
                                                 
10 Our preferred measure of terms of trade is an index of commodity terms of trade, including 43 commodities, 
with coverage for 55 countries. Because it is based on internationally traded commodities, it is arguably 
exogenous to national policies (e.g. exchange rates) and thus it is used for much of the Fund’s work on 
exchange rate assessment. 
Alternatively, we used the monthly terms of trade measure provided by Datastream, which compiles individual 
country authorities data, and for this measure found that in a sample of 12 IT and 13 non-IT countries, IT 
countries suffered on average a severe terms of trade shock, with a relative drop that reached 10 percentage 
points by the end of 2009 (results available upon request). 
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In column 3, we focus on non-advanced countries and replicate a result previously presented 
by Blanchard and Faruqee (2010) that short-term external debt was a very important risk 
factor for GDP contractions: an additional 10 percentage points of GDP of short-term 
external debt in 2007 implies on average a 3 percent reduction in growth rates in the first 
semester of 2009. It is also true that short-term external debt/GDP ratio accounts for more 
variation in economic activity in the crisis aftermath than any other variable we analyzed. 
 
In column 4, we find that openness to trade, measured as average ratio of exports and imports 
of goods and services to GDP over 2003-2007 has a negative effect, marginally insignificant, 
while we control for inflation targeting. However, changes in the commodity terms of trade 
and trading partners GDP growth are not significant once we control for inflation targeting. 
 
  
V.   CONCLUSION 
In the beginning of 2008, the most immediate problems for many policymakers were high 
commodity and fuel prices and their effect on inflation. In that context, some voiced concerns 
that inflation targeting was inadequate and should be abandoned by both developing and 
advanced. However it turned out that the greatest challenge for monetary frameworks since 
then was not fast rising commodity prices driven by buoyant global demand, but the major 
financial and trade disruptions and the greatest recession the world economy has seen since 
the Great Depression. 
 
This paper sets out to fill the scorecard of inflation targeting in dealing with this tail event. It 
presents results of a descriptive nature with the goal of establishing the stylized facts that will 
guide and motivate future research. We would like to caution the reader that we do not claim 
that the differences that we find in the data between IT and non-IT countries are causal. They 
may be, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to establish the validity of causal claims. 
 
To sum-up the findings, IT has had a positive scorecard thus far. The monetary policy of IT 
countries appears to be more suited to dealing with the crisis. Relative to other countries, IT 
countries lowered nominal policy rates by more and this loosening translated into an even 
larger differential in real interest rates. With this monetary stimulus, IT countries on average 
seem to have dodged the deflation bullet better than other countries. With their flexible 
exchange rate regimes, IT countries also saw sharp real depreciations which were not 
associated with a greater perception of risk by markets. Perhaps as a result of that, there is 
some weak evidence that IT countries did better on unemployment rates and advanced IT 
countries have had relatively stronger industrial production performance. For GDP growth 
rates, we found that advanced IT countries had higher GDP growth rates than their non-IT 
peers, but no such difference for emerging countries or the full sample, or when we added 
controls such as short-term external debt to GDP for the subset of emerging countries. 
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Table 1. OLS Regressions with time and country effects: 2003H1-2009H1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IT x 2009 0.020 0.070 -0.236
[1.72] [2.41]* [0.35]
IT x 2009 x Not advanced 0.009 0.074 -0.720
[0.63] [1.98]* [0.85]
IT x 2009 x Advanced 0.033 0.065 0.343
[2.86]** [1.89] [0.54]
Observations 642 642 640 640 642 642
Number of countries 51 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.54 0.36 0.36
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
GDP growth UnemploymentInd. Production
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Table 2. OLS Regression for cross-section of countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation targeting 0.011 -0.018
[0.012] [0.020]
Inflation targeting x Advanced 0.024 0.018 0.032 0.024
[0.017] [0.018] [0.016]* [0.017]
Inflation targeting x Not advanced -0.009 -0.012 -0.026 -0.009
[0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.018]
Short-term external debt/GDP, 2007 -0.306
[0.091]***
Openness/GDP, 2003-2007 average -0.013
[0.008]
Change in terms of trade, 2008-09 0.441
[0.436]
Growth 2008H1-2009H1, trading partners -0.004
[0.756]
Advanced -0.035 -0.030 -0.062 -0.035
[0.016]** [0.016]* [0.021]*** [0.016]**
Observations 56 56 26 56 47 56
R-squared 0.015 0.1 0.334 0.138 0.217 0.1
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Constant not reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Growth 2008H1-2009H1
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Data Appendix 
 
Our full sample excludes countries for which nominal GDP in dollars (variable ngdpd in the 
WEO) in 2002 was less than USD 10 billion; Zimbabwe because it is an outlier on several 
dimensions; Angola, Qatar, Sudan and United Arab Emirates because their inflation rates at 
the INS dataset are constant over several months, and the United States. This leaves us with a 
full sample of 84 countries. Notice that Iceland, perhaps the inflation targeter with the most 
troublesome crisis, and also the only one that has suspended IT during the crisis, is cut off the 
sample because it does not meet the criteria on nominal GDP.  
 
The 84 countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, P.R.: Mainland, China, P.R.: Hong Kong, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, I.R. of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea, Republic of, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Republic 
of, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan Prov. of China, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rep. Bol., Vietnam, and Republic 
of Yemen. 
 
There are 25 IT countries in the sample. The IT classification was based on Friedman and 
Laxton (2009) and Roger (2009) and the countries coded as IT are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Republic of 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Republic of 
Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and United Kingdom.  
 
There are 4 countries that have fully-fledged inflation targeting (Friedman and Laxton, 
2009), i.e. they have inflation targeting and they publish their endogenous interest rate 
forecast: Czech Republic, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. 
 
We define emerging market countries (n=31, of which 12 IT countries, with data through 
December 2009) as those for which we could gather the J.P. Morgan EMBI spread: 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, P.R.: Mainland, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Republic of Serbia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Rep. Bol. Venezuela, and Vietnam. 
 
The definition of advanced economies is the same as the WEO (n=30): Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, P.R.: Hong Kong, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
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France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Prov. of China, and United Kingdom. Notice that the United 
States has been excluded from the sample, and that the Czech Republic belongs to both the 
advanced and emerging economies sample. 
 
The real effective exchange rate (REER), the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) 
and inflation rate all come from the IMF/INS database. The REER is based on trade-
weighted CPI indexes. 
 
The unemployment rate data comes from several sources: IMF/IFS, IMF/GDS, Haver and 
Datastream/Eurostat. IFS countries are Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and 
Uruguay. GDS countries are Chile, Colombia, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. Haver countries are Venezuela, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Russia, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Taiwan Province of China, and Kazakhstan. Eurostat 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. There are 49 countries (22 IT) with 
monthly unemployment data up to August 2009. 
 
Industrial production (n=59) data comes from IFS, Haver or Datastream. IFS countries are 
Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Euro Area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua , Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Haver countries are Argentina, Belarus, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Datastream countries are Cyprus, Kazakhstan (both with monthly data), Australia, China, 
P.R.: Hong Kong, New Zealand and Switzerland (with quarterly data, interpolated log-
linearly to a monthly frequency). 
 
Policy rate (n=47, of which 21 IT countries) data comes from the IMF/GDS database. It 
covers the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, P.R.: Mainland, China, P.R.: Hong Kong, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
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Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan 
Prov.of China, Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom. 
 
The variables short rate (n=45, of which 21 IT countries) come from IMF/GDS database. 
Coverage for short rate goes through October 2009. 
 
The variable discount rate (n=45, of which 19 IT countries, sample through July 2009) 
comes from IMF/IFS database, variable 60...ZF... with the exceptions of Australia 
(60L..ZF...) and Mexico (60P..ZF...). 
 
 
